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Comparative research on multi-level politics has highlighted many of the core 
dynamics of regional party competition, electoral behaviour, coalition formation, and party 
organisation (Hough et al, 2003; Hough and Jeffery, 2006; Swenden and Maddens, 2009; 
Hopkin and Van Houten, 2009; Stefuriuc, 2009). Meanwhile, scholars of regionalist parties 
have compared their organisation, strategies, and objectives (Tursan and De Winter, 
1998; De Winter et al, 2006; Hepburn, 2010), while others have focused on the varying 
response of statewide parties to these regional challengers (Roller and Van Houten, 2003; 
Swenden and Maddens, 2009; Hopkin and Van Houten, 2009). Yet political scientists 
have rarely sought to link changes in the balance of territorial power with broader shifts in 
the role and structure of parties in contemporary democracies. These include the growing 
reliance of parties on the resources and legitimacy of the state (Katz and Mair, 1995); a 
continued process of partisan de-alignment (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002); a sustained 
fall in party membership (Mair and Van Biezen, 2001); the declining capacity of parties to 
aggregate social demands (Schmitter, 2001); and greater internal party democracy 
(Hopkin, 2001). More recently, scholars have noted the growing power of executive 
leaders in advanced democracies that are becoming de facto “presidentialised”. This is 
occurring in entrenched parliamentary systems, including countries characterised by 
coalitional politics, and often in the absence of formal institutional changes (Poguntke and 
Webb, 2005). The study of presidentialisation has so far been limited to the national level, 
yet remarkable processes of state decentralisation in Europe (Marks et al, 2008) have 
given greater resources and visibility to sub-national leaders (Swenden and Maddens, 
2009). Studies of local politics have noted the rising trend in direct election of mayors 
(Magre and Bertana, 2007), and the impact of these institutional changes on the 
relationship between executive leaders and supporting parties (Fabbrini, 2001), but this 
analysis has never been extended to the regional level. Although some authors have 
noted the emergence of party “barons” in the Spanish regions (Van Biezen and Hopkin, 
2006), or powerful directly elected presidents in Italian regions (Fabbrini and Brunazzo, 
2003), no study so far has explored the relationship between presidents and parties at 
regional levels of government. 
Poguntke and Webb (2005) argue that the process of presidentialisation in 
advanced democracies is being driven by a complex combination of factors: changes in 
the structure of mass communication and political campaigning; the growing 
internationalisation of decision-making; the erosion of traditional social cleavage politics; 
and the need for greater coordination of increasingly complex and sectoralised states. The 
authors argue that executive leaders are increasingly autonomous from the demands of 
their own parties, and increasingly powerful within their executives, while competitive 
elections are increasingly personalised around them. These inter-linked processes are 
described as the Party, Executive, and Electoral faces of presidentialisation. While this 
picture appears broadly plausible and borne out by many national case studies, it does 
posit a series of analytical questions about the precise dynamics of presidentialism. To 
what extent is presidentialism a process of gaining autonomy from parties, rather than 
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growing personal control over these parties? What is the precise relationship between 
executive and party control, are these interdependent or does one lead to the other? Are 
political parties an enabling or constraining force for presidentialisation? Also relevant is 
whether formal rules to strengthen presidents are more important than informal changes 
in political practice, and whether coalitional politics or factional differences can still present 
a significant constraint on presidentalised leadership. Other questions to consider are 
more specific to regional politics. The tendency to build up strong local coalitions of 
support for individual mayors is common in local politics (Fabbrini, 2001), but is it always 
feasible in “meso” level governments that contain a larger set of competing territorial 
interests? To what extent is presidentalism an outcome of the nominating capacity of 
regional presidents, and is clientelism a relevant party of the explanation? Can regional 
presidents successfully pursue autonomist strategies without undermining their 
relationship with the national party, and does this relationship pose real limits to their 
autonomy? Are presidents increasingly able just to govern past parties (Poguntke and 
Webb, 2005), or are these rival forms of political authority locked in a bitter struggle for 
supremacy (Calise, 2006)? The case studies of Italian and Spanish regions in this article 
will address some of these questions by focusing on the executive and party faces of 
presidentalism. The picture that emerges is complex and hinges on the role of presidents 
in factional and coalitional politics, as well as the perceived organisational and electoral 
threat that presidents pose to the continuity or vitality of regional party organisations. As a 
result, relations between parties and presidents differ widely, and parties can have both 
an enabling and a constraining effect on presidentialisation. 
This article compares the dynamics between regional presidents (executive 
leaders) and political parties in Italy and Spain, consolidated democracies that have 
undergone significant but incomplete processes of regionalisation. Regional governments 
in Spain have been given greater autonomy in a wide range of policy areas, and many of 
the financial resources needed to carry out these tasks (Beramendi and Maiz, 2004). 
Despite the strong potential for policy divergence, Spanish regions have remarkably 
similar political systems. All are parliamentary regimes, where the regional president is 
nominated and replaced by the legislature, with parliamentary candidates elected on 
closed party lists to serve four year terms. Italian regions have more policy autonomy 
since the 1990s, but levels of institutional performance vary widely (Putnam et al, 1993). 
Most regions are still constrained by their reliance on the national level for financial 
resources, as well as the slow judicialised process of determining the scope of new 
regional competences (Roux, 2008). Yet Italian regions have very different political 
systems to the national level, with the direct election of regional presidents since 1995. 
Presidents are able to nominate their executive without any formal input from the 
legislature, and any vote of censure leads to the simultaneous dissolution of all regional 
organs (presidency, executive, legislature). Voters cast separate ballots for the presidency 
and the legislature, with the former elected on a regional list, while the latter are elected 
on provincial lists through preference voting. These lists are tied together so that the 
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parties supporting the president are guaranteed a majority in the legislature, through the 
allocation of a variable bonus to the winning coalition. The outcome is a “semi-
parliamentary” system that is neither presidential nor parliamentary in a classic sense 
(Fabbrini and Brunazzo, 2003), inspired by a similar system used for the direct election of 
mayors in Italy (Fabbrini, 1993). This contrasts sharply with the national level, where Italy 
remains a classic parliamentary democracy (at least in formal terms), with a pre-eminent 
role for party groups in decision-making. In the Italian case, we can analyse the dynamics 
of presidentialism in a political system where this has been facilitated by changes to the 
organisation of regional government, but must also contend with a political context 
characterised by prominent and powerful national party leaders. In the Spanish case, we 
can analyse similar dynamics in a political system that is very much parliamentary in 
formal terms, yet subject to strong presidentialising tendencies within both statewide 
parties and the national government (Van Biezen and Hopkin, 2005). 
The case studies in this article reflect findings from a broader research project that 
compared party politics in large Italian and Spanish regions. The Italian case studies 
compared a southern region governed by the centre-left coalition (Campania) with a 
northern region governed by the centre-right coalition (Lombardia). The Spanish case 
studies compared a southern region (Andalusia) governed by the centre-left Spanish 
Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), with a northern region (Galicia) governed by the centre-
right Popular Party (PP). The project involved extensive archival analysis of local and 
national editions of Italian and Spanish newspapers, in particular (but not exclusively) La 
Repubblica and El Pais, to establish a clear process tracing of events in the regions 
concerned. This archival analysis was supplemented and reinforced by 46 in-depth 
interviews, mainly with regional politicians (usually current or former members of the 
regional legislature), but also with political advisers and journalists.1  
The findings note the effective interdependence of executive and party control in 
regional governments, as regional presidents use their political visibility and nominating 
capacity to build a personalised control over their respective party organisations, even in 
the absence of formal party control (as in Italy). But parties can also significantly constrain 
the leadership capacity of regional presidents, particularly when acting as veto players in 
the legislature. These constraints are most evident where government is characterised by 
complex coalitions, in which other parties feel threatened by the power of regional 
presidents and seek to counter-act this through disruptive mechanisms of political 
differentation. Regional presidents can build a strong consensus by developing 
autonomist strategies and mediating in factional or coalitional disputes within their party or 
coalition. Yet they are also constrained by the need to avoid diverging from the strategic 
priorities of the national leadership, whose support is necessary to allow the personalised 
                                                     
1
 The in-depth interviews were carried out in Naples (12), Sevile (9), Milan (11), and Santiago de 
Compostela (13) between February and November 2007. The list of interviewees can be requested 
from the author.  
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party control of regional presidents to remain resilient. These complex trade-offs suggest 
that regional presidents have gained greater autonomy by controlling regional branches of 
their statewide parties, but that the national context in which both presidents and parties 
operate still imposes a limit to exercising this autonomy. All regional presidents in these 
case studies spent significant periods of time in service at national level, culminating 
either in an unsuccessful bid for the national leadership or an unsuccessful stay as party 
leader. Their entry into regional politics was a way to develop an independent powerbase, 
while keeping a distance from new and unfamiliar alignments in national politics. All these 
regional presidents faced the vexed problem of succession, but handled it with varying 
degrees of success. The remainder of this paper will analyse the Italian and Spanish case 
studies in turn, followed by some comparative conclusions. 
 
CAMPANIA 
Antonio Bassolino was directly elected as regional president of Campania in 2000, 
with the support of a broad-based centre-left coalition that stretched from far left parties to 
centrist politicians that had recently been aligned with the centre-right coalition. Bassolino 
was comfortably re-elected in 2005 at the head of a similar coalition. The numerous 
parties supporting his leadership bid obtained 54.2% (2000) and 61.6% (2005) of the party 
vote, so Bassolino’s personal appeal played only a limited role in securing electoral 
victory. Yet his deft management of coalitional politics and capacity for political 
aggregation should not be ignored in any explanation of centre-left electoral success in 
Campania, and contributed to securing his own comfortable re-election in 2005. 
Bassolino’s mediating style of leadership allowed the centre-left coalition to win control of 
most key sub-national governments during the 2000s, including the largest municipalities 
and provinces in the region. This system of power was based on an over-extended 
governing coalition with little internal coherence, which proved to be a significant 
constraint on Bassolino’s capacity for strong leadership, and produced a regional 
government that was both weak and clientelist, adding to many of the structural problems 
already afflicting the region. Although Bassolino remained as regional president until his 
second term ended in 2010, his political credibility in later years was undermined by 
numerous cases of mismanagement and corruption in the sub-national governments of 
Campania, and by the abject failure to resolve a serious refuse management crisis in the 
province of Naples. 
Bassolino was elected regional president after significant experience in both 
national and local politics. Both proved vital to maintaining a controversial system of 
power in place at regional level, while securing sustained backing from national leaders. A 
native of the region, Bassolino had been a prominent national parliamentarian of the 
Italian Communist Party (PCI). He led a failed bid for the leadership of its main successor 
party, the Party of the Democrats of the Left (PDS), having earlier fought to prevent the 
fragmentation of the PCI along ideological lines. Bassolino hailed from the “Left” faction of 
the PCI, some of whose members joined the reformist PDS, while others formed the more 
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radical Party of Refounded Communists (PRC). Bassolino returned to Naples in  as PDS 
“party commissar” in 1993, given the responsibility of rooting out corruption in the local 
party organisation. He used this as an opportunity to launch a successful bid to become 
the first directly elected Mayor of Naples in 1993, campaigning on a platform of clean 
government and urban renewal, and nominating an entirely “technical” executive that 
excluded party politicians. He was re-elected in 1997 with a landslide victory (Allum and 
Cilento, 2001). On the surface this looks like an example of a leader governing past 
parties, but in practice Bassolino used the opportunity to build a team of close 
collaborators within the Naples PDS (which accounted for 60% of the regional party). The 
Naples PDS had been a factionalised and demoralised organisation, leaning towards 
closer collaboration with progressive elements of the Christian Democrats (DC), and 
drawn largely from the “Right” faction of PCI. While never entirely suppressing the 
factional differences of the PDS or its successor party DS, and without standing for any 
internal party positions, Bassolino set about establishing a close personal control over the 
party organisation, initially as mayor of Naples and later as regional president. Radical DS 
factions were reassured by Bassolino’s ideological proximity, demonstrated by his support 
for the failed Cofferati-Berlinguer leadership bid in 2001, as well as his close personal ties 
to PRC leader Fausto Bertinotti.  Reformist DS factions were reassured by Bassolino’s 
subsequent loyalty to the Fassino-D’Alema DS leadership, and his support for party 
integration with progressive DC politicians at national level, culminating in the merger to 
form the Democratic Party (PD) in 2007. Both factions were equally keen for government 
nominations, which Bassolino had the (almost exclusive) power to dispense as executive 
leader. Yet his control never extended to the province of Salerno, where Enzo De Luca, a 
directly elected DS mayor with populist leanings, had carved out an independent 
powerbase within the party and territory. DS also remained weak in the more sparsely 
populated inland provinces of Caserta and Benevento, dominated by former DC 
powerbrokers. This required Bassolino to engage in complex coalitional trade-offs to 
advance and sustain his regional leadership.  
Bassolino’s decision to stand as regional president in 2000 occurred without prior 
agreement of the governing parties (Allum and Cilento, 2001). Although the 1995 regional 
election had been won by the centre-right coalition, a coordinated series of defections by 
key DC powerbrokers led to the constitution of an alternative centre-left coalition in 1999. 
Local powerbrokers are a feature of regional politics in Campania, sustained by 
preference voting in sub-national elections (Calise, 2006), and an intensely clientelist and 
somewhat corrupt form of distributional politics (Allum and Allum, 2008). The moving force 
behind the 1999 defections was Clemente Mastella, leader of Udeur and a local 
powerbroker in Benevento. Also active in recruiting politicians for the centre-left was 
Ciriaco De Mita, regional leader of the Italian Popular Party (PPI) and a former national 
DC leader, who was the main powerbroker in Caserta. At regional level, PPI and its 
successor party DL became dominated by an alliance of local powerbrokers that 
responded to the leadership of De Mita. The latter became engaged in intense 
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competition for personnel and votes with the rival factional alliance led by Mastella. This 
competition prevented either group from nominating an agreed candidate for the regional 
presidency, allowing Bassolino’s self-nomination to fill the vacuum (Allum and Cilento, 
2001). The price to pay was that both factional leaders sought excessive protagonism in 
the subsequent centre-left governments. Both factional leaders insisted on their right to 
nominate powerbrokers from their alliance to key positions in the regional executive and 
related agencies (formally a right of the regional president), largely to ensure the 
continued vitality of their faction and prevent defections. Bassolino was obliged to fill his 
regional executive mainly with party politicians rather than technical experts. Although the 
regional president ensured that members of his executive were not concurrently members 
of the regional council, this did not guarantee their loyalty as most members of the 
executive continued to take orders from faction leaders. It also produced a lack of 
coordination within the regional government, as the legislature blocked a series of political 
initiatives advanced by the executive, with no “over-lapping” politicians to support 
government proposals in the legislature.  
Processes of government formation in 2000 and 2005 were turbulent and 
protracted, with perennial crises and continual resignations, generally on request of 
factional leaders pushing for more (or better) positions for their collaborators. Where 
Bassolino exercised his discretion in appointments, this was seen as an attempt to 
undermine party prerogatives rather than as an attempt to assert coherent leadership. 
This even had a self-fulfilling effect, as some modernising PPI/DL politicians began to 
align themselves with Bassolino rather than De Mita, particularly in the city of Naples.  
Although the centre-left coalition comfortably won the 2000 regional election, it was only 
by the middle of the legislature that the executive had the support of all parties and was 
able to govern with a modicum of stability. The 2005 election was a crushing victory for 
the centre-left that nevertheless ushered in a period of even greater turbulence. DL had 
narrowly surpassed DS to become the largest party in the region, yet Udeur also 
increased its support, so both De Mita and Mastella were keen for more posts to support 
their growing factional alliances. This support was only obtained by exacerbating the 
clientelist tendencies of the regional government and by eliminating any remaining 
technical experts from the regional government or its associated agencies and bodies. 
Governing stability was not improved. Instead, the smaller parties propping up the 
coalition began to revolt against the primacy of the big three (DS, DL, Udeur), and sought 
to disrupt legislative proceedings. These had always been problematic in the region, given 
the tendency for parties or politicians opposed to a particular measure to simply boycott 
the legislature, ensuring a lack of quorum and suspending sessions.  Legislative paralysis 
occurred even before the refuse management crisis and related corruption scandals 
reached their critical peak in 2008, which saw ordinary regional decision-making 
effectively grind to a halt.  
Despite strong pressure from the national leadership, particularly the new PD 
leader Walter Veltroni, Bassolino never resigned as regional president and served out his 
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full term, while maintaining an influential position within the Naples PD. In the last years of 
his regional government, Bassolino’s political freedom of manouevre was somewhat 
enhanced after Ciriaco De Mita and Clemente Mastella abruptly left the centre-left 
coalition in 2008, albeit for different reasons. Whereas De Mita left the PD after Veltroni 
blocked his re-election to the Italian Parliament, Mastella brought down the Prodi 
government in 2008 and later saw his personalised control of the Udeur organisation (and 
its finances) become the object of corruption investigations. Both factional leaders shifted 
their remaining support behind the centre-right coalition in Campania, which comfortably 
won the 2010 regional election. yet now governs with many of the same kinds of internal 
tensions and contradictions that characterised the Bassolino decade. This includes a bitter 
struggle for political personnel and financial resources between parties that are often mere 
vessels for the development of personal factions (Calise, 2006). Yet Bassolino’s loss of 
political credibility became apparent with the decision to field his regional DS rival, Enzo 
De Luca, as centre-left candidate for regional president in the 2010 election. 
 
LOMBARDY 
Roberto Formigoni was first elected regional president of Lombardy in 1995, with 
the support of a centre-right coalition that included Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (FI) and 
Gianfranco Fini’s National Alliance (AN), but did not extend to Umberto Bossi’s Northern 
League (LN), which had recently brought down the first Berlusconi government. Formigoni 
was comfortably re-elected with LN support in the 2000, 2005, and 2010 regional 
elections. Formigoni’s tenure as regional president of Lombardy shows differences as well 
as similarities with the tenure of Bassolino in Campania. Although the Lombard president 
has been more successful in ensuring a coherent regional government with clearer 
leadership, this is also significantly constrained by the terms of coalitional politics. Not only 
is the LN keen to differentiate itself from Formigoni and reluctant to fully recognise his 
coalitional leadership, the regional president is also obliged to conform to coalitional 
choices imposed by the national party leader. Formigoni’s powerful position in regional 
politics was secured through a growing personalised control of FI at regional level, and 
later its successor People of Liberty (PDL). Yet this type of control means his choices 
require a degree of consensus that prevents any real deviation from the strategic 
preferences of Berlusconi. In this respect, Formigoni is more restrained by his own party 
than Bassolino was in Campania. The latter was given a free hand to govern so long as 
this proved electorally succesful, and any governing problems did not contaminate the 
national political debate, which only happened after the Naples refuse crisis exploded. 
Before standing as regional president, Formigoni had been a DC parliamentarian 
with close ties to the ancillary business group Comunione e Liberazione (CL), particularly 
strong in the Catholic “sub-culture” of the region of Lombardy. Both Formigoni and CL 
survived the corruption scandals of the 1990s relatively unscathed, and the Lombard 
politician was among the founders of CDU, a DC splinter party allied with Berlusconi. 
Formigoni’s decision to enter regional politics occurred soon after his failure to obtain the 
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leadership of CDU, prompting the need to construct a new powerbase from which to 
advance his political career. Formigoni only joined Forza Italia in 1998 and was not among 
the initial business group linked personally to Berlusconi, which soon constituted a “liberal” 
faction that dominated the early regional party. Formigoni’s tenure saw him promote an 
alternative faction, composed largely of former DC politicians close to CL, but also 
cultivate close ties to former Italian Socialist Party (PSI) politicians in Forza Italia. This 
produced tensions with the liberal faction, then led by FI regional coordinator Paolo 
Romani, which saw its role in the regional government becoming diminished. This long 
factional struggle reached its high-water mark in the 2000-5 legislature, when Romani’s 
faction boycotted the regional legislature, while Formigoni’s faction boycotted the regional 
party.  This produced some paralysis in the regional legislature, as it coincided with a 
simultaneous boycott by LN, producing a lack of quorum. This struggle was eventually 
resolved in favour of Formigoni’s faction, which came out on top after the 2005 regional 
elections and proceeded to shut out the liberal faction from key party and institutional 
positions, leading to the resignation of Romani as regional coordinator in 2006. Formigoni 
achieved his control without needing to hold internal party posts, showing the resilience of 
informal ties in Italian party politics. 
Formigoni’s control over FI in Lombardy was founded on his capacity for party 
nomination to institutional posts and a wide array of public bodies, often used selectively 
to help his supporters. Yet his leadership within the executive depended on also 
recognising the nominating capacity of other coalition partners. LN, AN, and UDC made 
their own nominations to posts on the regional executive, while Formigoni only determined 
the posts allocated to FI. Formigoni chose most of his executive from among existing 
regional councillors, who then held both posts simultaneously. This common practice was 
discouraged by the 1995 and 1999 institutional reforms, which sought to more clearly 
separate the functions and composition of regional executives and legislatures (Vassallo 
and Baldini, 2000). The lack of separation in Lombardy had the positive effect of ensuring 
greater coordination between the activities of executive and legislature. Since regional 
legislation had the input of key members of the legislature, it was often adopted quickly so 
long as there were no major party conflicts. AN and UDC were the smaller parties in the 
regional coalition, and having been granted a substantial number of political posts, 
generally acquiesced in the leadership role of Formigoni. In contrast, LN sought to 
differentiate itself from Formigoni and often sparked conflicts with his leadership, most 
bitterly over the dismissal of the LN Health Minister Alessandro Ce. LN adopted the tactic 
of boycotting the regional legislature or threatening to vote against the government. LN 
held the parliamentary balance of power after the 2000 regional election, despite not 
having been necessary for coalitional victory, because of the erratic allocation of bonus 
seats under the regional electoral system. Formigoni had sought to avoid including LN in 
the 2000 pre-electoral coalition, but Berlusconi and other national leaders imposed this as 
part of a broader coalitional agreement with LN that extended to general elections 
(Wilson, 2009). Although LN soon developed a strong blackmail potential in both regional 
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and national legislatures, it also saw its distinctive position threatened by Formigoni, who 
adopted strident positions in favour of greater policy and fiscal autonomy for the region, 
and advanced his own proposals on a federal reform of the Italian state. This allowed 
Formigoni to appropriate many LN demands on the issue that most defined their raison 
d’etre as a political movement. Formigoni couched his autonomist demands in more 
constructive and institutional terms, appealing to moderate voters alienated by the political 
vulgarity and extremism of LN. Nevertheless, the objective of greater regional autonomy 
also provided a useful glue to hold together the governing coalition and project a common 
sense of purpose. The competitive dialectic between FI and LN in Lombardy initiated 
several federal reform proposals that were later adopted by the centre-right government at 
national level, including the system of fiscal federalism that is currently being negotiated in 
the Italian parliament.  
Relations between Formigoni and LN improved greatly in the 2005-10 legislature, 
with no substantial legislative paralysis and more harmonious inter-party relations. 
Formigoni recognised that LN support was now indispensable to his continued electoral 
victory, after a nationwide swing against the centre-right in the 2005 regional elections, 
that saw centre-left governments victorious everywhere except the LN strongholds of 
Lombardy and Veneto (Di Virgilio, 2006). LN no longer saw the regional president as an 
existential threat to their movement, with their core support holding up well in contrast to 
the decline in FI support. Also crucial to this pacification was Formigoni’s decision to relent 
on the idea of fielding a “personal list” in the 2005 regional elections, which would have 
increased his personal power within the governing coalition (Mazzoleni, 2005). Strong 
pressure from Berlusconi also contributed to this decision, with the Prime Minister 
increasingly a hostage of LN demands. The 2010 regional elections saw LN support reach 
unprecedented levels, improving on their already exceptional support in the 2008 general 
election. LN became the largest party in Veneto (where they fielded a presidential 
candidate), and in Lombardy they came close to beating PDL into second place. The 
result is a more turbulent current legislature, where LN is less willing to recognise the 
leadership role of Formigoni, and more willing to openly contest his decisions. There have 
been no serious breaches yet in Formigoni’s personal control over the regional PDL 
(indeed he controls his own recognised faction), or any concrete attempts to bring down 
the regional government, yet the leadership position of Formigoni remains dependent on 
the vagaries of coalitional politics at national level. Coalitional politics poses a very real 
constraint on the leadership capacity of regional presidents in Italy, now more so than in 
the 1990s, when corruption scandals in the governing parties diminished their credibility 
and created a power vacuum filled by directly elected leaders at sub-national levels 
(Fabbrini and Brunazzo, 2003).  
 
ANDALUSIA 
Manuel Chaves became regional president of Andalusia in 1990, after standing as 
PSOE candidate in the elections of that year. He stood again in the next 5 regional 
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elections (1994, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008), before leaving the post of regional president in 
2009 to become Spanish Minister for Territorial Policy. Chaves nominated a close 
collaborator, José Antonio Griñán, as his successor in the regional party and government. 
Chaves certainly benefited from the powerful position of PSOE in Andalusia, where it has 
never lost a regional election, yet he also shaped that position by leading the party 
through moments of serious crisis in the 1990s, including factional divisions, legislative 
paralysis, and electoral decline. Key to his executive leadership capacity was formal party 
control. In contrast to Italy, this remains necessary in Spain because the party in central 
office holds a very tight control over all elected representatives, and has the exclusive 
capacity to nominate candidates for public office on the basis of closed electoral lists (Van 
Biezen and Hopkin, 2006). Although regional presidents are nominated by the parliament 
rather than directly elected, all parties campaign with a presidential candidate, and in 
cases of coalition it is unusual for the president not to be from the largest party. This 
creates a form of de facto direct election in regional politics that is very similar to the 
national level. 
Chaves stood as regional president while a national parliamentarian and 
government minister, close to the PSOE Secretary-General Felipe Gonzalez and his 
powerful deputy Alfonso Guerra, all natives of Andalusia. Although PSOE comfortably 
won the 1990 regional election, Chaves entered regional politics in an inauspicious 
moment, as factional struggles began to surface in the long-governing party. Described as 
a struggle between older socialists led by Alfonso Guerra (guerristas) and younger social 
democrats seeking party renewal (renovadores), these factional disputes also took on 
personal and territorial dimensions. Andalusia was a key battleground in symbolic terms 
(as the political fiefdom of Guerra) and practical terms (it accounted for 25% of votes in 
the party congress). Factional conflict had already brought down Chaves’ predecessor as 
regional president, who had dismissed many supporters of Guerra from the regional 
executive, so was later removed from party office and as candidate for the 1990 regional 
election. Chaves’ first moves in this factional dispute were aimed at conflict mediation, 
attempting to hold together his nascent regional executive in the midst of bitter in-fighting. 
A turning point came in candidate selection for the 1993 general elections: guerristas set 
about purging party lists of anybody suspected of weak loyalty to their leaders; suspicions 
were aroused that Guerra sought control of the national party; and many PSOE regional 
parliamentarians began to defect to the renovadores. Chaves began to discreetly operate 
in favour of the renovadores at regional level, excluding older guerristas from his regional 
executive in 1994, and standing himself as candidate for regional secretary-general. Until 
then the guerrista Carlos Sanjuan had held the post, dividing party and institutional control 
in Andalusia. Chaves defeated Sanjuan with 64% of votes in the regional congress. This 
set off a chain reaction whereby the guerristas were eventually defeated as an organised 
faction throughout Spain. In Andalusia, Chaves was able to project the role of regional 
president as a unifying figure of authority that transcended parties and factions, while 
asserting the benefits of unifying party and institutional control. His growing personal 
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control over the party organisation was very much linked to his nominating capacity as 
regional president, but also a general willingness to tolerate internal pluralism and a light-
handed intervention in local disputes. These were mostly managed by his subordinates in 
relatively autonomous provincial units, with only unresolvable issues passed to Chaves for 
final arbitration. This contrasted with the obsessive top-down control of the Guerrista 
faction, and allowed the regional president to avoid becoming heavily entangled in 
parochial internal problems of limited electoral benefit. 
Chaves soon secured an unchallenged leadership within the regional party, as 
evident from plebiscitary levels of support for his subsequent re-election as secretary-
general in regional party congresses. Yet the regional president also had to contend with 
declining support for PSOE in the 1990s, as a result of governing fatigue and corruption 
scandals, mainly at national level. This influenced the 1994 regional election, where 
PSOE lost its absolute majority and became unable to govern due to the intransigence of 
United Left (IU), which formed a parliamentary coalition with the centre-right PP to 
obstruct the PSOE minority government at every turn. Chaves dissolved the legislature 
after little more than a year and coincided the forthcoming regional election with the 1996 
general election, a pattern repeated for all subsequent regional elections in Andalusia. 
This proved an excellent strategic move, as PSOE voters were more inclined than those 
of other parties to vote exclusively in general elections. PSOE improved its performance in 
the 1996 regional election, while IU was harshly punished by its voters for the 
parliamentary alliance with PP (Montabes and Torres, 1998). To secure a majority, PSOE 
formed a governing coalition with the small regionalist Andalusian Party (PA) that lasted 
for two full legislatures. Coalitional politics proved highly advantageous to PSOE as the 
larger and more visible party (Montables et al, 2006). PSOE restored its absolute majority 
in the 2004 election (and retained it in 2008), while PA lost all its seats after the 2008 
election. A more serious threat to Chaves’ leadership came from the national level, as the 
resignation of Gonzalez in 1997 triggered internal divisions and the emergence of a 
divided leadership of Josep Borell (PM candidate) and Joaquin Almunia (secretary-
general) (Hopkin, 2001). In response, PSOE regional ‘barons’ sought to substitute 
collectively for the lack of strong national leadership, providing internal continuity while 
securing a greater degree of autonomy for themselves (Mendez, 2000). Chaves 
performed an instrumental role as PSOE leader in the largest Spanish region, rallying the 
party behind the election of Zapatero in 2000, despite having earlier backed his rival Jose 
Bono (regional president of Extremadura) in the leadership election. This transitional 
mediating role was recognised by Zapatero in the decision to nominate Chaves to the 
honorary post of PSOE President. More substantially, Chaves’ backing ensured significant 
autonomy in the handling of the regional party. The subsequent process of internal 
renewal complied with national demands for generational and gender change, but was 
handled almost entirely in Andalusia by Chaves and his lieutenants, ensuring a strict lid on 
internal dissent and continued control in setting the priorities of the regional government.  
Chaves’ ability to dominate regional politics rests partly on his mediating capacity 
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and ability to project a unifying vision of regional leadership, while ensuring close party 
control through a network of loyal collaborators. It is also the fruit of a constructive 
relationship with the national leadership. Zapatero proved more willing than most of his 
predecessors to recognise regional party autonomy (perhaps out of necessity, given his 
own highly contested leadership election). Although PSOE electoral successes in 2004 
and 2008 contributed significantly to the re-election of Chaves, the latter did not merely 
ride the coat-tails of a resurgent national PSOE, as he also won the 1996 and 2000 
regional elections that coincided with PSOE defeat at national level. The success of the 
regional president rested partly on his capacity to project an autonomist vision for PSOE 
Andalusia, tied to the expansion of self-government and an active role for government in 
the regional economy. Close relations with the central government were justified less on 
partisan lines and more on the need for infra-structural investment in Andalusia as a 
poorer region subject to historical neglect. The pursuit of autonomy was exemplified in the 
reform of the regional statute of autonomy in 2007, which was almost as ambitious as its 
Catalan counterpart (Keating and Wilson, 2009). The autonomist narrative of PSOE was 
partly appropriated from the nationalist narrative of PA, including its favoured writers, 
myths and symbols. The effect on PA over time was disastrous, as the regionalist party 
found itself having to adopt more extreme positions to differentiate itself from PSOE 
(Montabes et al, 2006). This culminated in the incoherent opposition of PA to the 
Andalusian statute reform, which triggered its electoral and organisational collapse. 
Chaves heavily shaped the autonomist politics of his region, with significant advantages to 
his own party, which was able to personify institutional leadership in Andalusia at a time of 
growing tensions over resource allocation and the extent of regional autonomy. 
 
GALICIA 
The ascendancy of Manuel Fraga as regional president of Galicia shows 
considerable similarities to his Andalusian counterpart, despite their opposing political 
affiliations and contrasting political backgrounds. The similarities are most evident in their 
ability to construct successful political machines out of regional parties that had become 
riven by factional conflict. Fraga constructed a unifying vision of regional leadership that 
transcended internal divisions, and pursued an autonomist strategy that provided a 
common purpose for regional government and marginalised opponents as unsuitable for 
advancing regional autonomy. Yet despite his considerable successes, Fraga was 
eventually defeated in his fifth regional election, and presided over a party that remained 
heavily factionalised despite his own uncontested leadership. This was partly due to 
Fraga’s unwillingness to handle the question of party change and factional divisions in a 
direct manner, and partly a result of his very success in dominating regional politics and 
projecting a powerful autonomist narrative, which forced rival opposition parties to ally 
together more effectively to oust PP as the dominant governing force in the region. 
Fraga first stood as regional president in the 1989 election and soon secured an 
absolute majority for the PP. He had recently founded this party at national level but 
Alex Wilson Presidents and Parties in Regional Politics... 
ICPS, Working Paper 308 
 
15
immediately handed the reins to a younger successor, Jose Maria Aznar, who unlike 
Fraga was untainted by collaboration with the Franco regime. Fraga had also been a 
founder of Popular Alliance (AP), the predecessor to PP and largely a party of Franco-era 
notables. The decision to return to his native region hinged on a desire for Frago to allow 
his successor a free run in national politics, and a valiant attempt to bolster the standing of 
PP in a region where it had been unseated two years earlier by an unlikely alliance of 
PSOE and conservative Galician nationalists. As a visible national figure, Fraga was in an 
ideal position to campaign electorally for the Galician PP, which he constructed as a loose 
alliance of former AP notables, conservative Galician nationalists, Christian democrats, 
and centrist liberals. Fraga held this alliance together by projecting an autonomist vision 
that hinged on greater regional policy autonomy, active promotion of the Galician 
language, and a territorialised reform of the Spanish state. It also implied the continuation 
of party-clientelist ties of resource distribution that did much to favour the standing of PP 
politicians, but rather less for broader socio-economic development in the region (Maiz 
and Losada, 2000). PP secured four successive majorities in the regional legislature 
(1989, 1993, 1997, 2001), and on three of these occasions a majority of votes. The 
regional legislature was no longer fragmented, with only three parties winning seats: PP, 
PSOE and the leftist Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG). A raised electoral threshold in 1993, 
approved by the PP largely for partisan gain, prevented the rise of new rivals or the 
resurgence of old ones. The Galician electoral system also over-represents the least 
populated eastern provinces where PP support is strongest, while the often determining 
role of Galicians abroad in regional elections contributes to disproportionately enhancing 
the share of seats won by PP (Pallares et al, 2006). Although PP grouped together 
politicians from a wide range of different parties, Fraga was less concerned about 
asserting strict internal control and more concerned with ensuring personal loyalty. This 
did not prevent the emergence of strong factional divisions within the regional party, 
although all concerned took care to profess their absolute loyalty to Fraga. The latter was 
content to play these factions off against each other when it suited him, but avoided taking 
explicit positions that might compromise his unchallenged leadership. This made an 
ageing Fraga unable to hand over the reins to a unifying successor, delaying his 
departure for several elections, with the result that there was no replacement in the 
regional leadership until Fraga’s defeat in the 2005 regional election at the age of 83.  
Factional divisions in the Galician PP revolved around the presence of provincial 
“barons”, influential in Galicia through their control of provincial governments that 
distribute funds, often on a selectively partisan basis, to the array of small and dispersed 
municipalities that characterise this predominantly rural region (Maiz and Losada, 2000; 
Keating, 2001). These powerbrokers formed a series of factions for dominance in the 
regional party, with the hope of succession when Fraga retired from the political scene. 
This departure was delayed on several occasions, with the justification that internal 
divisions were too bitter to allow a chosen successor to emerge. The factions became 
known as the galleguistas and the Espanolistas, and transcended earlier differences in 
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the background of PP politicians. The galleguistas were stronger in rural Galicia, 
supported greater regional autonomy within both party and government, more actively 
favoured the development of the Galician language, and were attached to conservative 
paternalism reinforced by clientelist ties. The Espanolistas were stronger in urban Galicia, 
less concerned about regional autonomy and development of the Galician language, and 
promoted a more liberal and free-market vision of economic development (Keating, 2001). 
As with any factions, these often hinged on personal divisions and developed into 
territorial powerbases, making it hard for any group to gain full ascendancy. Territorial 
powerbases became reinforced through a tendency to delegate candidate selection to 
powerful provincial ‘barons”, resulting in a regional executive composed of different 
factions that only Fraga could be trusted to balance fairly. The prevalence of clientelist 
politics and weak economic development in a region governed by a former Francoist 
Minister encouraged parties on the centre-left to unite much more strongly to oppose PP 
rule. 
PSOE and BNG had earlier been divided over their positions on regional autonomy 
and their broader ideological positions, with BNG tending to radical nationalist positions 
and socialist economic policies, while PSOE was weakly supportive of greater regional 
autonomy as the basis for economic development, and supported free market economic 
policies with a social safety net. As BNG gained support and moved closer to PSOE on 
socio-economic issues, PSOE moved closer to BNG on the question of regional autonomy 
(Maiz, 2003). This was partly a response to the autonomist drive of Fraga’s PP, which 
appropriated many of the myths and symbols of Galician nationalism to support his 
conservative project (Lagares, 2003), and left PSOE rather isolated in its attachment to 
centralism (Jimenez, 2003). Although differences on the extent of regional autonomy 
remained between PSOE and BNG, these parties allied closely to overthrow PP 
governments in the main Galician municipalities. This process of coalition testing was 
eventually transposed to regional level after the 2005 election, when PSOE and BNG 
swiftly formed a governing coalition to remove Fraga from office (Pallares et al, 2006).  
Although PP remained the largest party in Galicia, factional disputes and an 
ageing leadership had undermined its cohesion by the 2005 election. Subsequent 
exclusion from regional and key provincial or local governments weakened the clientelist 
ties that the various factions had previously exercised. This was to prove most beneficial 
to the Espanolista faction, which gained a clear ascendancy over the galleguistas. 
Whereas Fraga had not intervened actively in advancing a particular faction, many of his 
positions on autonomy were closer to those of the galleguistas. As national leader, Aznar 
was unwilling to intervene in the politics of a region dominated by his mentor Fraga. What 
shifted the balance of power was the designation of Mariano Rajoy as future PP leader in 
2003, which turned a regional dispute into a potentially treacherous attempt to challenge 
the new national leader, who had always been aligned with the Espanolistas. Although 
structural differences in the nature of political patronage across urban and rural areas of 
Galicia have not disappeared, these no longer form a component of a larger factional 
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struggle for leadership, even when the PP returned to power after winning the 2009 
regional election. Intra-party factionalism was perhaps an inevitable by-product of an 
ambitious attempt by Fraga to construct a loyal personal party able to secure electoral 
success and governing unity in a matter of months. While this says much about the role of 
executive leadership in party organisations at regional level, it also demonstrates that 




This article demonstrates that regional presidentialism is occurring in political 
systems with both direct and indirect election of executive leaders, and applies to both 
single party and coalitional governments. This reinforces similar findings in the study of 
presidentialism at national level (Poguntke and Webb, 2005). However, the case studies 
of Italian and Spanish regions outlined here shed more substance on the precise 
relationship between the executive and party faces of presidentialism. Not only are these 
effectively interdependent and mutually reinforcing, but in all cases party control 
(governing through parties) is more important than autonomy from parties (governing past 
parties). Formal party control is necessary in the Spanish cases, where the party in central 
office remains predominant within all levels of the party organisation, while informal 
mechanisms of control characterise the Italian cases, where the party in public office is 
dominant at sub-national levels. Coalitional partners not affiliated to the president’s party 
can have a constraining and even disruptive effect on executive leadership, particularly 
when they feel threatened by presidential power. Parties can and do exploit their veto 
power in the legislature, as a way to frustrate growing presidential influence within the 
executive. Nevertheless, regional presidents are able to assert a highly personalised 
control over regional branches of their statewide parties, by mediating in factional disputes 
and using their nominating capacity to advance supporters. Since personalised control 
rests on a form of intra-party consensus that would be shaken by serious divergence from 
the national leadership, this obliges regional presidents to comply with the latter on 
strategic choices. Regional presidents can sometimes use their authority to mediate in 
party conflict at national level, which makes national leaders more willing (or even obliged) 
to tolerate their growing personal power. Regional presidents can hold together broad 
coalitions of support by projecting an autonomist discourse that provides a narrative for 
political office, obfuscates problematic governing styles (e.g. widespread clientelism), and 
personifies regional authority in negotiations with other territorial levels. This autonomist 
drive is not equally strong in all cases, and appears weakest in mainland regions of 
southern Italy. The case of Campania highlights party differences and territorial tensions 
between the provinces, whose powerbrokers are keen to resist over-centralisation at 
regional level. Also relevant is the widespread perception that fiscal autonomy and federal 
reform are designed to benefit northern Italy and penalise the South, especially since 
these are key demands of the Northern League. Control of regional governments is an 
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attractive career path for prominent politicians that are excluded from leadership positions 
at national level. Yet the highly personalised system they tend to develop in office can 
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